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While industrial organization, industry concentration, 
and market power have been an important research 
topic for agricultural economists, it was clear that the 
content of this research has not been communicated to 
policy makers, industry members, and the media.  
Likewise, it is clear that the economic factors that have 
impacted the cattle industry for the past 10 to 30 years 
are not common knowledge beyond that industry.  The 
purpose of this fact sheet is to offer a short summary of 
those factors and hopefully have a modest impact on 
the current policy discussion. 
 
Often, I have seen concerns expressed over the shrink-
ing size of the beef cattle industry – both in numbers of 
beef animals, most notably the beef cow herd, and the 
number of beef cattle producers.  This was done often 
at the USDA/DOJ Competition Workshop in Fort Col-
lins, Colorado, that was held during August of 2010.  
But good intentions can lead to poor policy if the poli-
cy alternatives are at odds with the facts or the science.  
A number of people have communicated that concen-
tration is the only problem facing the cattle and beef 
industry and that the meatpacking industry is the main 
cause of most economic problems.  The purpose in this 
document is to offer a summary of the economic fac-
tors that have impacted the beef industry over the past 
years and see if the meatpacking industry is the main 
problem. 
 
Supply and Demand 
 
Figure 1 is a representation of the total cattle inventory 
in the US as of January 1 each year.  The figure easily 
communicates the concerns expressed by a number of 
participants at the competition workshop.  The cattle 
inventory in the US grew strongly from the 1930s 
through the mid-1970s and peaked at over 130 million 
head.  The presence of the boom and bust cattle cycle 
is also easily seen.  But something changed in the 
1970s.  Since the mid-1970s the inventory has declined 
substantially – while the cattle cycle persisted.  A num-
ber of speakers at the competition workshop compared 
statistics between 1980 and 2009.  Across this time 
period there has been a loss of approximately 20 mil-
lion animals from inventory.  What are the biggest 
causes of this? 
 
Figure 2 presents the beef demand index that is much 
used in extension education, is tracked and published 
by a number of market followers, and was developed 
by Wayne D. Purcell at Virginia Tech in the mid-
1990s.  Dr. Purcell developed the index to facilitate 
demand education efforts with producers following the 
demand declines that were observed during the late 
1980s.  What does the index do?  The index holds sup-
ply and inflation constant, and communicates an index  
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Figure 1.  Total Cattle Inventory 
Figure 2:  Retail Beef Demand Index. 
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of the consumers’ willingness to pay for beef.  For  
example, the index was approximately 200 in 1980 and 
had fallen to approximately 100 in 1998.  What does 
that mean?  It means between 1980 and 1998 that the 
US consumers’ demand for beef approximately halved.  
This can only be described as catastrophic.  In 1998 the 
consumers’ willingness to pay for beef was half of that 
in 1980.  This is without a doubt the single most      
important economic factor impacting the cattle and 
beef industry.  Further, it is a well-known phenome-
non.  It is largely why the beef industry has a check-off 
program.  It is why the industry invests in new product 
research and methods to improve beef quality.  The 
only issue – in my mind – that is worse than this     
demand change is if demand would have continued to 
decline from 1997 until 2010.  If the trend of the 1980s 
and 1990s is extrapolated into the 2000s then the index 
could be between 70-80% and this implies that beef 
and cattle markets would be 20-30% weaker than the 
prices we see at the end of 2010. 
 
Is this demand decline a problem caused by the meat-
packing industry?  It is possible that the concentrated 
meatpacking industry added to this problem but indus-
try structure is not the cause.  The beef demand index 
presented makes use of a retail beef price and is thus 
not a price due to the packing industry.  This price is 
determined before the packer and in the interface    
between the consumer and retailer.  In fact, the meat-
packing industry was negatively impacted by changes 
in beef demand.  Declining demand makes maintaining 
market share and innovation difficult.  And emphasizes 
cost cutting and cost management. 
 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate what was happening with 
production during the years of declining demand.  
While figure 1 shows a smaller cattle herd, the pounds 
of beef produced in 2009 is comparable to that pro-
duced in 1980 with 20 million fewer animals.  How 
can the cattle industry produce as much beef with few-
er cows?  Increased productivity is the answer.  The 
cattle industry thoroughly adopted Continental breed 
genetics into what was typically an English breed herd.  
The industry has also improved animal nutrition, ani-
mal management, and makes use of growth pro-
motants.  The bottom line is that beef production per 
cow has grown almost 150 pounds per animal.  About 
500 pounds of beef was produced per cow in 1980 and 
that number has increased to almost 650 pounds per 
cow in 2010.  That is a 30% increase in productivity.  
It is an interesting and alarming exercise to think about 
what cattle and beef prices would be had the industry 
maintained a 115 million head herd, experienced a 
30% increase in productivity, and experienced the 50% 
demand decline.  To focus on the numbers of beef 
cows and numbers of beef producers without consider-
ing demand and productivity is tunnel vision. 
 
The important take-home message is that changes in 
demand and supply have had a substantial impact of 
the size of the cattle and beef industry and the number 
of producers participating in that industry.  And have 
nothing to do with concentration and the packing    
industry. 
 
Other Costs and Other Factors 
 
The changes in supply and demand are long term 
changes that clearly impact the shape of the current 
cattle and beef industry.  What about other – shorter 
term – factors?  In the early 1980s, trade played a    
minor role in cattle and beef markets.  Less than 2% of 
production was exported and imports amounted to less 
than 4% of consumption.  Trade was simply not im-
portant.  The 1980s and 1990s changed all that.  Beef 
exports grew considerably, relative to imports, over 
these 20 years.  (See exports Figure 5.)  By the late 
1990s, net exports added $1 billion to $2.5 billion   
annually to the beef industry.  The value of beef trade 
is presented in Figure 6.  However, this new money 
disappeared in 2004 with the discovery of BSE in the 
US and the closing of world markets to US beef.  Sev-
eral important markets reopened immediately but trade 
of beef in 2010 has not yet returned to the levels estab-
lished prior to 2004.  Simply put, these are lost oppor-
tunities for cattle producers.  This is money not made, 
product not sold to a consumer who values it most, and 
the losses in wealth over the last 7 years that can simp-
ly never be recovered. 
 
Figure 7 presents a graphic of the University of       
Nebraska’s Drought Monitor map for each August 
from 2000 until 2009.  In only two or three of the past 
ten years has there not been drought within areas of the 
US with significant beef cow numbers.  Persistent 
drought also appears to cause permanent economic 
losses to the cattle industry.  During times of drought 
beef cows are sold and producers often exit the indus-
try to not return. 
 
Figure 8 presents the national average corn price paid 
to farmers from 1986 until 2010.  There is one price 
spike upward prior to 2006, and that year was 1995, 
and 1995 was a drought impacted year.  Prior to 2006, 
 





































Figure 3:  Beef Production (Red Line) and Cattle Inventory (Blue Line) 
Figure 4:  Beef Production Per Cow in the U.S. Inventory  
 







































Figure 5:  US Beef Exports as a Percent of Production  
Figure 6:  The Value of Exports of Beef and Cattle Net of the Value of Beef and Cattle Imports  
 












































the corn market is predictability between $1.50 and 
$2.40 per bushel.  After 2006 however, the price aver-
ages well above $3.00 per bu.  This is a substantial cost 
that impacts all of animal agriculture – probably      
impacting cattle the least – but impacting all animal 
agriculture nonetheless.  And if growing and feeding 
costs increase then it is simple economics that prices 






















returns to  cattle feeding using a USDA Economic  
Research Service budget.  The missing piece to this 
cash returns series is returns from hedging and risk 
management.  But the impact post-2006 is clear.  Corn 
prices and the demand for corn-based ethanol that 
drove corn prices higher have had a considerable    
impact on cattle feeding enterprises and on prices that 
can be paid for calves and feeder cattle. 
Figure 7:  Drought Monitor Maps for Each August from 2000 to 2009  
Figure 8:  US National Average Corn Price Paid to Farmers  
 

























Figure 10 presents futures prices for light-sweet crude 
oil since the early 1980s.  Prior to 2000, $40 per barrel 
was a problem.  It was a problem because such a high 
price would result in a slowing economy and a strong 
chance for a recession.  Now, $40 is also a problem but 
for the opposite reason.  When we observed $40 oil in 
2008-09 it meant that the economy was growing so 
slow that the economy is in the biggest recession since 
the Great Depression.  This fundamental change in 
energy prices, and in the prices for all energy intensive 
inputs that production agriculture needs, has had a sub-
stantial impact on production agriculture including cat-
tle production. 
 
Finally, while interest rates are at historical lows and 
have been since the early 2000s, there remains a credit 
crisis and difficultly in financing high risk enterprises.  
And high risk defines production agriculture and the 
cattle industry. 
 
Thus, the numbers of other factors that impact costs 
one way or another all appear to stack one way and 
negatively impact the profitability of beef cattle pro-
duction.  These factors – as well as changes in demand 
and productivity – may be well known and experi-
enced by many.  But these factors were not discussed 
much at the competition workshop.  Many were never  
 
 
mentioned.  There was almost no mention of demand, 
no mention of increased productivity, almost no men-
tion of trade, no meaningful mention of corn prices and 
feeding costs, almost no mention of high input costs 
and limited assess to capital.  This lack of a grounding 
of the discussion in facts is a problem that has the po-
tential to lead to poor policy choices.  Economic reali-
ties need to be recognized in the policy arena.  If poli-
cy choices the focus on minor economic issues then 
they will have little positive impact.  And always have 
the potential for unintended consequences and negative 
impacts. 
 
Meatpacking Concentration and Economic Issues 
 
The issue that was much talked about in Fort Collins 
was the level of concentration within the meatpacking 
industry.  Figure 11 presents the percent of steer and 
heifer slaughter and the percent of boxed beef produc-
tion by the four largest beefpacking firms.  The four 
largest firms slaughter and fabricate into boxed beef 
slightly more than 80% of the industry totals.  This is a 
concentrated industry by any measure or comparison.  
However, it is not unprecedented – examine the soft-
ware industry – and the concentration in the meatpack-
ing industry has not changed since the late 1980s.  The 
names of the firms have changed but the location and  
Figure 9:  USDA Calculated Monthly Returns to Cattle Feeders  
 































Figure 10:  Monthly Average Closing Prices for Crude Oil Futures Contracts  
Figure 11:  Four-Firm Concentration Ratio for Fed Steer and Heifer Slaughter and for Boxed 
Beef Production 
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composition of plants and company headquarters have 
generally not. 
 
So what are the issues and what can be done about it?  
First, students of industrial organization know that 
measures of concentration – while easy to document – 
are not informative as to conduct.  And it is conduct 
that is important.  It is not illegal to be a monopolist 
but it is illegal to act like one.  Monopolies – based on 
economic justification – may impart economic benefits 
as well as have the potential extract economic rents.  
Second, considerable research has been conducted into 
whether the level of concentration in the meatpacking 
industry has had bad economic outcomes.  A multitude 
of research has been conducted and published in scien-
tific journals as to this question.  The research began in 
the 1940s, bloomed in the 1960s and 1970s, and had 
serious limitations of the early fruits addressed in the 
1980s, 1990s and 2000s.  What can be learned from 50 
years of research? 
 
First, the variety of ways to measure market power and 
the negative impact of monopolies – or monopsonies  
in the case of meatpacking – are considerable.  And 
there is no unifying approach or study.  There are 



























studies.  What do these studies find?  Everything can 
be found if one is selective.  There are studies where 
substantial market power is found and this a small pro-
portion of the research.  There are studies where no 
market power is found and this is also a small propor-
tion of the research but generally greater than the vol-
ume of work showing damaging market power.  Far 
and away the largest portion of research shows signifi-
cant but modest market power.  What the research gen-
erally does not say is that the meatpacking industry is 
in need of antitrust action. 
 
So if it’s not market power then what is driving this 
industry to the high levels of concentration that is 
seen?  Simply put: economies of size.  Large plants 
and large firms can slaughter and fabricate beef far 
more efficiently than smaller counterparts.  The large 
firms can pay slightly more for inputs such as cattle 
than their smaller counterparts, secure larger market 
shares, and eventually compete the smaller firms out of  
business.  Thus, over time smaller plants and firms 
disappear and/or are replaced by larger plants and 
firms. 
 
Figure 12 offers and example from the 2007 USDA 
GIPSA RTI Livestock and Meat Marketing Study.   
Figure 12:  Average Total Costs of Slaughter and Fabrication Per Head for a 
“Representative Plant” based on the RTI LMMS 
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The average cost curve was derived from plant level 
profit and loss data from the four largest packers.  The 
dollars reported are in $2003 terms.  The largest of the 
plants can slaughter and fabricate close to 2 million 
head per year and costs were approximately $120 per 
head.  The smallest of the commercially viable plants 
slaughtered and fabricated approximately 1 million 
head per year and costs were approximately $140 per 
head.  This example is not unique.  While the market 
power research finds a variety of different measure of 
market power, the cost economy research solidly finds 
economies of size.  Further, while the 2007 LMMS had 
access to unique data, there is simply no other research 
that looks for economies of size and does not find it.  
Economies of size are well documented. 
 
The logical next question is: do the cost economies 
offset the measure of market power?  This question is 
much less researched but when it is done the findings 
clearly state the cost economies are orders or magni-
tude larger measures of market power.  The 2007 
USDA GIPSA RTI Livestock and Meat Marketing 
Study has this finding with respect to Alternative Mar-
keting Agreements (AMAs) which are often called 
captive supplies.  The cost savings and demand  
improvement related to AMAs is substantially larger  
that market power exercised through AMAs.  As a fur-
ther concrete example, suppose the large plant in figure 
10 was replaced with two “small” plants – this requires 
believing a 1 million head per year plant is a small 
plant.  The cattle feeder selling into this market would 
now have two bidders as opposed to one.  But the bids 
from those bidders would both be $20 per head higher 
costs and $20 per head less money with which to bid.  
It is simply not the case that market power is persis-
tently something on the order of $20 per head.  The 
question turns on is there sufficient competition within 
the regional fed cattle markets so that single buyers in 
any one region effectively are in competition with buy-
ers from other regions.  And even the answer to this 
question is affirmative.  The research that attempts to 
define regional markets finds that all cattle markets are 
linked and there is no market within the US that is a 
separate market.  The fed cattle market is effectively a 
national market. 
 
Captive Supplies – or More Correctly Alternative 
Marketing Agreements 
 
Not only is the packing industry singled out as the 
problem in cattle and beef markets, there has been a 
 
focus by numerous groups on captive supply cattle.  
Over the years there have been a number pieces of leg-
islation proposed to prohibit non-cash market methods 
of marketing fed cattle.  What are captive supply or 
AMA cattle?  AMA cattle are animals marketed not 
through the cash market cattle – AMAs are packer-
owned, forward contract, and formula cattle.  And 
within the beef industry, packer-owned and forward 
contract cattle are relatively small in number and rather 
stable over time – 5-10% of total marketings within 
each.  So AMAs are primarily formula cattle.  The 
numbers of formula marketings are 30-60% of total. 
 
What is the issue with AMAs?  It is argued that AMAs 
are used by packers to reduce demand for cattle in the 
cash market and thereby reduce cash market prices.  
Interestingly, this is a very well studied question.  
There are a dozen published works where the largest of 
which are the congressionally mandated 1996 Concen-
tration Study and the 2007 LMMS mentioned above.  
Both studies examined every transaction in the country 
during the respective study periods.  For the 1996 Con-
centration Study that was a 13-month study period  
from 4/1992 to 4/1993.  And for the 2007 LMMS that  
was a 30-month period from 10/2002 through 3/2005.  
Again, both studies were conducted under the authority 
of USDA GIPSA and both had access to all transaction 
by every packer during the study periods.  What was 
found?  Strategic behavior by packers in the use of 
captive supplies was hard to find.  And there was very 
little of any impact on fed cattle prices which could be 
termed due to market power through the use of AMAs. 
 
Why is that?  The arguments against AMAs fail to rec-
ognize two important realities.  First, AMAs do reduce 
demand.  AMAs reduced the volumes that are pur-
chased in the cash market.  But AMAs also reduce sup-
ply by the exact same amount.  Suppose the packers 
within a region of the country require 20,000 animals 
per week.  Suppose the cattle feeders within that region 
routinely have 20,000 animals per week available for 
sale.  The market is arguably in balance: the quantity 
needed is equal to the quantity available.  Next, sup-
pose the packers have available to them 12,000 head of  
AMA cattle.  Demand for fed cattle by the packers is 
reduced 60%.  But AMA cattle are also removed from 
the available supplies.  Thus, it remains that the      
packers need 8,000 animals that week and there are 
8,000 animals available for sale.  The market remains 
in balance. 
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Second, statements that packers can use AMAs to ma-
nipulate the market fail to recognize who makes what 
decision with respect to the marketing of AMA cattle.  
The marketing agreements underlying AMAs are    
always the intellectual property of the cattle feeder.  
The cattle feeder owns the cattle and makes the deci-
sion as to when the cattle are marketed.  The cattle 
feeder contacts the packer and lists the animals that 
will be marketed one to two weeks later.  The packer’s 
decision is choosing the day within the week of deliv-
ery.  And the price paid is some weekly current or pri-
or week price that is determined by formula.  Further, 
the cattle under formulas almost always are marketed 
on some type of grid where there are premiums and 
substantial discounts for improperly marketed animals.  
There is a base formula price and then premiums and 
discounts on individual carcasses.  In this setting 
though, where the cattle feeder makes the marketing 
decision, there is no such thing as captive supplies. 
 
And not only is there strong evidence that AMAs are 
not used to exercise market power, there is strong evi-
dence that AMAs are important to the beef industry.  
This is a major finding of the 2007 RTI LMMS. 
 
AMAs allow the producers and packers that use them 
to improve efficiency.  Livestock producers and espe-
cially meatpackers have high fixed costs.  The larger 
the volumes of animals that are fed and slaughtered 
then the per-head costs are reduced.  The LMMS found 
that AMAs allow packers to reduced costs.  Packer 
P&L data showed AMAs resulted in plants operated at 
high capacity and more predictable volume.  Both    
reduce costs.  AMAs also allow packing plants to oper-
ate at lower costs regardless.  The total increase in effi-
ciency is $6.50 per head on all cattle slaughtered and 
not simply the cattle under AMAs.  In other words, this 
$6.50 per head benefit is on all of the 20-25 million fed 
animals slaughtered annually during the study period. 
 
Face-to-face interviews with producers also clear    
reveal efficiency improvements through the use of 
AMAs.  Producers that use AMAs have higher inven-
tory throughput and feedlot turnover.  Producers that 
use AMAs have lower overhead and other non-feed 
and non-feeder-animal costs.  For example, formula 
yards have fewer feed mills, fewer feed trucks, and 
fewer personnel than cash market years.  The most sig-
nificant efficiency improvement is from increased 
throughput.  Formula yards simply know when pens 
will be emptied and can plan for refilling of those pens.  
 
 The industry average feedyard capacity utilization is 
in the high-70% or low-80%.  The average capacity 
utilization for a feedyard marketing under a formula is 
in the low-90%. 
 
The use of AMAs also has helped improve beef      
demand.  There has been a substantial increase in the 
amount of branding associated with beef products.  
The beef industry has transitioned from a total com-
modity product to a position where close to a majority 
of the beef sold is branded.  From the perspective of 
the retailer or food service firm, developing and selling 
a branded product requires a predictable supply.  
Branded or other value-added characteristics also tend 
to require some additional service be performed by the 
producer or feeder.  For example, the feeding of vita-
min E to cattle increases the shelf life of the beef prod-
uct in the grocery store.  Increasing the shelf life     
increases the retailer’s profitability.  There are many 
other food safety, palatability, and product identifica-
tion examples.  But from the perspective of the produc-
er, providing these services incurs additional costs and 
requires a guaranteed market with predictable premi-
ums.  The development and use of an AMA satisfies 
all of these requirements. 
 
Finally, AMAs allow for reducing the transactions 
costs that are associated with using the cash market.  
Bidding and offering in the cash market requires peo-
ple and typically these are expensive personnel.  Use 
of AMAs allows the packer to procure cattle with few-
er cattle buyers.  Use of AMAs allows the personnel 
within the feedyard enterprise that used to spend 3-4 
days per week marketing cattle to perform other func-
tions within the enterprise.  Trading cattle through the 
cash market risks having no trade – or reduced trade – 
occur.  In this situation, cattle may be marketed at less 
than idea or optimal weights and quality.  Packers risk 
having too few or too many animals of desired quality 
mix purchased.  Uncertainty in sales and procurement 
is simply a cost.  These are transactions costs.  And 
AMA use allows for the elimination of all of these 
transactions costs. 
 
The economic justification for AMAs is clear as is the 
importance of AMAs to the cattle and been industry – 
especially at the cow-calf and feeder cattle producer 
levels.  AMAs allow for the substantial reductions in  
costs in the cattle and beef production and marketing  
system.  AMAs are the preferred method of coordina-
tion cattle production and marketing so that higher   
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value and value added beef products can be sold to 
consumers that value and demand them.  Reduced 
costs and improved demand results in higher beef pric-





The economic factors that have impacted and are    
impacting the beef industry are large in number and 
relatively complex.  There are no simple policy pre-
scriptions as to how to improve the profitability and 
sustainability – there is not one thing that needs done.  
And it is certainty not a concentration or market power 
issue. 
 
The main issue which the beef industry must address 
and continue to address is demand.  A return to persis-
tent declining demand will result in a smaller beef   
industry.  This is especially the case with continued 
and persistent improvements in productivity.  Any and 
all institutions and innovations that improve demand 
will benefit the industry. 
 
Perhaps the simplest thing that can help the beef indus-
try is increased trade through the opening of interna- 


























clearly the benefit the beef industry.  The current etha-
nol policy that the country has implemented is also a 
clear big impact on the beef industry – and every meat 
industry.  My point is not to advocate a policy change 
but it needs to be recognized that the new high-priced 
corn market that is ethanol demand drive has negative-
ly impacted every meat industry in the country and is 
the main cause for higher priced meats to consumers – 
domestic and foreign. 
 
The conclusion from research is that the cattle industry 
has benefited from the more concentrated packing   
industry.  Improvements in efficiency are substantially 
larger than any measures of market power.  And these 
improvements in efficiency result in high fed cattle, 
feeder cattle and calf prices. 
 
Finally, the conclusion from research is that the cattle 
industry has benefited from the development and use 
of AMAs.  These tools represent economic innova-
tions.  They reduce costs through improving efficiency.  
They facilitate coordination in production and market-
ing of high value and value added beef products.  They 
reduce transactions costs.  And, like more concentrated 
industry, these improvements in efficiency result in 
high fed cattle, feeder cattle and calf prices. 
 
